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This report sketches a series of considerations that operate within my art practice. 
They are intended to elaborate on and open up, rather than simplify, the processes by 
which I arrive at art works. The ideas discussed roughly fit into, or are products of, three 
efforts which run parallel and independent of one another: my studio practice and 
production of art works; the study of artistic practice in a general sense, not always 
dependent on my particular art practice; and the study of a broad range of image types. 
The serial arrangement of the sections is meant to convey the non-hierarchical 
relationships of the ideas. Selected art works I have produced are explicated as they relate 
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 The relationship between technology and image production is extensive, 
constantly changing, and therefore frequently unclear. I see the technological aspect of 
images as a crucial consideration, especially in art production; every image is made with 
some kind of technology, whether it is a painting, a photograph, a sand drawing or a 
satellite image, and the way it is made is part of its meaning. Recent imaging technology 
has, however, created special conditions for image production. Paul Virilio has claimed 
that, “[w]e are leaving the image behind – including the conceptual image by Warhol for 
Duchamp – for optics, and an optics that is corrected,” (The Accident of Art, 70).1 He has 
criticized Frank Gehry for developing a building using a popular architectural program, 
and challenged architects everywhere to develop their own software in order to surmount 
the restrictions of commercial programs (73-4). His notion of optical correctness, built on 
an analogy to political correctness, suggests a kind of idolatry: we now mistake 
computers for our aesthetic arbiters, allowing them to determine the parameters of what 
we think of as an image. Virilio speaks with the apocalyptic regret of his conservative 
Catholic demographic (and I read him accordingly), yet there is something pertinent in 
his desire to understand how aesthetics become standardized and controlled. I find it 
compellingly accurate that computer graphic design, among other sources, has led people 
to confirm machine aesthetics as not just legitimate or acceptable, but correct. 
                                                
1 Virilio uses the term optics to refer to vision disassociated from image content. This isolation of vision’s 
mode is the result of the ‘machine vision’ provided to cruise missiles and other weapons, and to 
surveillance mechanisms, among other technologies. 
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 Werner Herzog expresses the situation as the inability to find any image at all that 
embodies our culture: in Wim Wenders’s film Tokyo-Ga (1985), Herzog describes the 
extreme lengths (traveling to Mars or Saturn, for example) he would go to in order to find 
images that are “pure and clear and transparent” – as I understand it, images that are free 
of mechanical standardization. Wenders and Herzog are atop an observation tower 
looking over downtown Tokyo when Herzog says, “The simple fact is there are few 
images left. From here you can see everything’s been built up. There are few images to 
be found. One has to dig for them like an archeologist. One has to search through this 
ravaged landscape.”2 These statements help clarify my own impulses to deal with 
machine images while also critiquing and defying their influence. For Herzog, the 
massive swell of late Capitalist culture provides no answers: the incessant agglomeration 
of images has negated itself. It would seem that for him too, one must look away from 
machine images for any kind of hope. 
 When Virilio declares a transition from image to optics, he enters a discussion of 
machine aesthetics – instances of image production where the production technology 
controls the choices made, or rather forces certain choices to be made. Whether the 
technology is Adobe Photoshop or Illustrator, 3D special effects software, CAD 
programs, surveillance imaging, or satellite or missile vision, a calibration of images 
occurs somewhere within the technologies’ respective systems, a refinement of images 
that eventually leads its users to define the category of images they produce through the 
                                                
2 Quotations are taken from subtitles; Herzog speaks in German in the film. 
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technology used to produce them. The means by which machine images are made is also 
what qualifies them.  
The issue of machine aesthetics came into play for me when I began making 
images with a digital scanner. I first used the scanner to print collages as consolidated 
images, but then started manipulating imagery on the scanner bed while it was being 
scanned, resulting in a kind of ‘scanner drawing.’ These could be produced very quickly, 
and I soon had a large archive of scans of all kinds. Different gestures and techniques of 
manipulating images on the scanner bed led to an increasingly large vocabulary of image 
types. Some of the effects of this method are well-known and easily identifiable: color 
separation, resembling misregistration in screenprinting, occurs whenever an image is 
slid at certain angles from the scanner beam; some manipulated scanned images will 
remain readable, but will transform in wavy patterns that follow the same motions across 
the image perpendicular to the scan vector. Other gestures – scanning an image and then 
scanning the resulting image; creating an illusion of dimensionality through a back-and-
forth motion of an image on the scanner; manipulating multiple images on the scanner 
bed at the same time; and altering scanned images as a kind of post-production – read 
much more ambiguously, and it was these examples that led to more sophisticated and 
complex images (figures 1 and 2). 
This vocabulary of gestures, it soon occurred to me, was the result of working 
with the restrictions of the device; the scanner inevitably delimited a zone within which I 
could work. In response to Virilio’s admonishment, I scrutinized the scanning process, 
attempting to comprehend the degree to which I was allowing the device to guide my 
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choices. While the more complex images I’ve made seem less bound by the technology, I 
am still uncertain of how I feel about working with them. I made paintings from some of 
the scanned images as a way to separate the qualities produced by the scanner from the 
encoded form of the digital image (figures 3 and 4). This was done, among other reasons, 














figure 2: Flags and Cage, 2010 
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Reflections/Flags 
 The manipulated scans evoke some particular types of images that have been at 
the forefront of my thoughts for a long time: reflections and flags. Two of the paintings I 
made from scanned images, both titled Familiar Pool (figures 3 and 4), draw 
comparisons with pools of water, and with reflections. The paintings are composed of 
text that has been manipulated on the scanner, rendering it warped and wavy. The text is 
painted carefully so that it is as close to a printed image as I can make it; this is to 
contrast with a ground of dispersed oily paint upon which it sits. The random dispersion 
of the ground and the warping of the text-image present two different aspects of liquidity, 
and as a single image perhaps suggest a reflection. Roland Barthes effectively suggests 
the infinite complexity of the reflection’s meaning in Empire of Signs: 
In the West, the mirror is an essentially narcissistic object: man conceives 
a mirror only in order to look at himself in it; but in the Orient, apparently, 
the mirror is empty; it is the symbol of the very emptiness of symbols 
(‘The mind of the perfect man,’ says one Tao master, ‘is like a mirror. It 
grasps nothing but repulses nothing. It receives, but does not retain.’): the 
mirror intercepts only other mirrors, and this infinite reflection is 
emptiness itself (which, as we know, is form) (78-9). 
 
 The consistent warping along the vector of the scanner also suggests a flag in the 
wind. A defining feature of the flag as an image is its physicality; while images on flags 
often attain pure abstraction and symbolism, they are constantly subject to physical 
manipulation by the air. Some of my images, such as Flags, Flags and Cage, and 
Incendiary Flag (figures 1, 2 and 5), are made from images of flags that have been 
warped on the scanner, thus duplicating the vexilloid reference within a single image.  
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 These two things, reflections and flags, are vital for me when conceived as 
images, because they are specific forms that highlight, in different ways, the profound 
ambiguity at the heart of all images. Reflections might be seen as proto-images, images 
produced by the world of itself, or as the phenomenon that allowed man to first engage in 
representation. Flags blur the boundaries of image and object, being both a physical 
image and a flattened object. As images, they both operate metonymically: reflections 
show something that is in relation to them – next to, in front of, above, or below them; 
flags, even if designed through symbolism, come to designate something else (a king; a 
country) by virtue of its using the flag to represent itself. The conveyance of meaning in 
my work occurs metonymically rather than metaphorically; most of my work aligns itself 


















             
















figure 5: Incendiary Flag, 2011 
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Lightness/Stupidity 
In a lecture in Six Memos for the Next Millennium, Italo Calvino offers lightness 
as a potent value in literature (and life, by extension), one that he claims has been a goal 
in most of his writing. Lightness, for Calvino, distinguishes itself fundamentally from 
irrelevance, absurdity and banality, all qualities one might associate with it; it is a value 
readily aligned with the alacrity and flexibility of a great intelligence.3 From conjuring 
the myth of Perseus and Medusa (recalling the hero’s cloud-hopping sandals and the 
flying horse that sprouts from Medusa’s blood) to describing a witch astride her 
broomstick in the night sky, Calvino paints lightness as a quality replete with meanings, 
and one that often transfers itself onto the reader. Of his own endeavors, Calvino says, “I 
have tried to remove weight, sometimes from people, sometimes from heavenly bodies, 
sometimes from cities; above all I have tried to remove weight from the structure of 
stories and from language” (3). The notion of lightness suggests buoyancy and 
spiritedness, as well as the physical loss of weight.  
 Isa Genzken, echoing Calvino4, writes that, “[a]rt and architecture should avoid 
all Fascistoid tendencies. They should go along merrily and cheerfully, light-heartedly 
and intelligently” (Isa Genzken, 141). As I happened to come across these testimonies to 
lightness, I was simultaneously discovering that a sense of lightness, light-heartedness, 
and even comedy was permeating a lot of good work in the art world. This was one of my 
                                                
3 “…I hope to have shown that there is such a thing as a lightness of thoughtfulness, just as we all know 
that there is a lightness of frivolity.” (Italo Calvino, “Lightness,” Six Memos for the Next Millenium, p.10.) 
4 “Were I to choose an auspicious image for the new millennium, I would choose that one: the sudden agile 
leap of the poet-philosopher who raises himself above the weight of the world, showing that with all his 
gravity he has the secret of lightness, and that what many consider to be the vitality of the times – noisy, 
aggressive, revving and roaring – belongs to the realm of death, like a cemetery for rusty old cars.” (Italo 
Calvino, “Lightness,” Six Memos for the Next Millenium, p.12.) 
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first cues to slacken the serious modernist attitude communicated in my earlier work. 
Lightness, whether it translates into a humorous painting or allowing oneself to work 
openly with the products of one’s culture, seemed to me not only a method of escaping 
the modernism’s rigidity, but a necessary attitude in today’s world. 
 In the spring of 2010, I made three large paintings on six-by-six-foot canvases, on 
which I painted quick, invented portraits in taped-off rectangles (figures 6 and 7). The 
rectangles were placed somewhat randomly on the canvas, and each measured 12 by 16 
inches. After one layer of portraits dried I would begin a new layer, allowing the new 
portraits to overlap the old layers. This blocked out some portraits completely, while 
others were fragmented. I started these paintings primarily as a means of exploring how 
multiple, ‘independent’ images, can combine to form new, hybrid images; lightness and 
stupidity, however, quickly became prominent notions for how I could understand these 
works.  
The original intention in the first of these paintings was to not have any of the 
portraits revealed once the painting was completed – it would consist entirely of 
fragments of portraits that no longer read figuratively. As I built the painting up, 
however, I again felt I was in the clutches of a systematic strategy. It seemed riskier to 
leave the portraits revealed and some entirely intact: this would depict the process of the 
painting, the layering of images, while putting in abeyance my tendency to block out an 
obvious, undesired content.  
 As a result a lightness emitted from these paintings – from the deliberate 
countering of my strategy of obfuscation and from the stupid serenity of the faces that 
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stare out benignly, almost contentedly. It is as if the characters depicted deliberately 
foiled the paintings’ strategy, but only in order to show themselves complacently to the 
viewer. The implied grids prevent the paintings from becoming too silly or frivolous, 
while the contents of the rectangles tune the grids to an off-note; finally it is the grid that 
hides and only emerges softly from behind the aggressive frontality of the portraits. Many 
people have made comparisons between the Face Matrix paintings and social networking 
websites or the internet generally, comparisons that evoke lightness from another angle.56 
The portraits in these paintings struck me as stupid in two ways: the faces are 
those of stupid characters (most have idiotic expressions, odd head structures, and 
unreceptive, glazed-over eyes) and, as combinations of intact marks and sketchy drawing, 
they act as traces of my innate ‘signature’ or ‘hand.’ Gustave Flaubert addresses the 
stupidity of the act of making a mark, the inscription, in letters sent while touring 
Northern Africa. In his writing about Flaubert’s values, Jonathan Culler discusses a 
primary sight of the novelist’s journey: 
What could be more stupid… than the ‘bêtise sublime’ of carving one’s 
name in huge letters on Pompey’s column? The name itself, ‘Thompson,’ 
is quite meaningless, yet it stares one imperiously in the face, looms 
before one as a surface which one does not know how to deal with. ‘It can 
be read a quarter of a league away. There is no way to see the column 
without seeing the name ‘Thompson’ and consequently without thinking 
of Thompson.’ There is in Flaubert’s reactions a hint of jealousy: ‘This 
idiot has become part of the monument and perpetuates himself with it,’ 
                                                
5 “The second industrial revolution, unlike the first, does not present us with such crushing images as 
rolling mills and molten steel, but with ‘bits’ in a flow of information traveling along circuits in the form of 
electronic impulses. The iron machines still exist, but they obey the orders of weightless bits.” (Italo 
Calvino, “Lightness,” Six Memos for the Next Millenium, p.8.) 
6 The lightness of Facebook, for example, comes in part from the blurring of factual or semi-factual 
information about a vast majority of individuals, presented at the users’ discretion, with absurdity (beer 
pong photos, poor examples of wit, unbelievable honesty), also mostly presented at the users’ discretion, all 
within the consolidated and rigid framework of the website. 
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but it is due above all to his admiration for the profundity of this stupidity. 
‘Not only that, he overwhelms it by the magnificence of his gigantic 
letters.’ These letters testify for him to the ‘serenity’ of stupidity, and he 
concludes that ‘Stupidity is something unshakeable. Nothing attacks it 
without breaking itself against it. It is of the nature of granite, hard and 
resistant’(Flaubert: The Uses of Uncertainty, 176) (Quotations are from 
Flaubert’s letters). 
 
The gestural mark of a painter, the ‘personal’ trace of the artist’s hand, is not unlike 
Thompson’s parasitic inscription. The conditions in which the act occurs are different, 
but the will to be acknowledged or to present oneself to the world is the same. It isn’t that 
I don’t value individual style in historical paintings, even in some contemporary ones, but 
I cannot weigh the ‘stylistic’ gesture now without including its historical baggage. The 
unveiled mark, despite its quality, legitimizes itself through its referral to a vast history of 
precedents from Rembrandt to de Kooning; the painter rides on the back of painting’s 
history/legacy just as Thompson rides on Pompey’s back.  
What the Face Matrix paintings convey is this remainder of personal gesture. My 
inclination is to always blot out the mark in my work, the determinative expression of I 
am here, which usually appears to me as a residue of image-making that implies a will to 
originality, thereby underscoring my own stupidity.7 Making these paintings helped me to 
see what is really at stake – not so much the revealing of a personal stupidity, but a 
discourse of stupidity, a discourse that suggests that intelligence and stupidity are not 
mutually exclusive. As Flaubert asserts, there is an undeniable force in stupidity, a 
serenity and stasis that intelligence might very well envy. 
                                                
7 Albert Oehlen comments humorously yet poignantly on the relationship between stupidity and originality: 
“When I made Glocken und Glöckchen, 1990, the drawing of the man whose legs and arms were 
exchanged, I thought it so stupid that I could have sworn it existed at least twenty times somewhere else. It 
doesn’t, because no one has dared to draw it because it is so stupid.” (Albert Oehlen, I Will Always 
















figure 7: Face Matrix 2, 2010 
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Constellations  
The Face Matrix paintings suggest another project in my work: dispersal of 
meaning. Jacques Derrida points to both the textual supplement, which may be used to 
understand a text via what it lacks, and the parergon, or what lies between the work and 
not-the-work (a frame; the wall; captions; other text), as valuable to the reading of an art 
work; with these factors in mind, I cannot easily envision an autonomous art work, or an 
art work which solely embodies its own meanings8. Every art work has an aura of 
meaning around it which does not necessarily function in tandem with the work itself: the 
supplement and parergon compose, in part, this aura. My attention within an art work has 
therefore traveled outwards, towards the frame, the boundaries of the image, the side of 
the canvas, and the space between works. My work responds to the challenges of this 
notion in multiple forms; this section will describe the different ways I have come to 
understand different compositions of dispersed meaning. 
 The Face Matrix paintings, in their aggregation of individual images, represent 
one type of what I call constellations. Constellations are bodies of objects or images 
amongst which meaning or value disperses itself; it is not evident that they should be 
considered either single art works or bodies of art works. There is no consistent signifier 
that a group of objects or images could be considered a constellation; rather, the viewer 
must make such a judgment based on how he or she extracts meaning from them. The 
compositions of the Face Matrix paintings are fixed, and the relationships between the 
                                                
8 Roland Barthes speaks of the difficulty of withholding meaning, of the fact that meaning is inherent in 
things by nature; he has proved to be an important component of my understanding of the coexistence of 
multiple meanings within a work: “To suspend meaning is an extremely difficult task requiring at the same 
time a very great technique and total intellectual loyalty. That means getting rid of all parasite meanings, 
which is extremely difficult.” (Roland Barthes, “On Film,” The Grain of the Voice, p.21.) 
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images within a single work constant; yet in many ways the crux of these works lies in 
the coexistence of rigidly defined separate images on a single painted surface. I have 
experimented elsewhere with smaller images that make up larger ones, such as the 
paintings Wall and Limbo (figures 8 and 9). I originally came to think of constellations, 
however, as compositions of multiple objects within a given space. 
I began a series of objects (paintings, photos, scanned images, framed objects) 
based on the still life – piles of flattened and stacked materials in my studio, a kind of 
dimensional compressed form of visual interference – in which each consecutive piece 
was derived from some image in the previous work (figures 10 and 11). The series began 
from a desire to fix these ‘found’ compositions into an image, but slowly grew into a 
language about drifting and fugitive images. The transitory properties that define and 
delimit an image, the genealogy of the images, began to emerge as the content of the 
group. The original values of the source images receded, amplifying the means by which 
they resurfaced and transformed in various incarnations. The value of the series, then, 










 Transitive painting, rather than dispersing meaning amongst multiple objects as in 
a constellation, places the painting-object at the intersection of systems of knowledge, 
exchange, etc. Objects functioning within this paradigm call attention to the networks of 
which they claim to be a part, apparently becoming a new point at which the systems’ 
meanings are doled out, or simply acting as a marker or sign pointing outward to the 
networks. David Joselit, who coined the term, states that transitive painting takes many 
forms, but the impetus it satisfies is marked when he writes, “[c]ertainly, painting has 
always belonged to networks of distribution and exhibition, but Kippenberger claims 
something more: that, by the early 1990s, an individual painter should explicitly visualize 
such networks” (“Painting Beside Itself,” 125). He cites the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
definition of transitive – “expressing an action which passes over to an object” – again 
affirming that the art works he discusses operate as passageways rather than endpoints 
(128).  
Joselit highlights Cheyney Thompson in a different essay as an artist whose work 
thrives on varied associations and arcane sources. Thompson’s work exists as a 
realization of so many choices derived from specific, obscure trails of knowledge, 
choices whose material formulations do not admit any apparent relation to one another. 
For example, his Chromochrome and Chronochrome series, closely related, conflate 
historical art material tropes (the pattern of a woven linen surface; standardized canvas 
shape and size formats), an archaic and highly dubious three-dimensional color scale, a 
tonal scale based on the time of day that the artist is painting, and the 18th century French 
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villain archetype of Robert Macaire. Whether or not Thompson hopes his viewers to see 
all of these strands of information in his work is unclear; what is important to me, though, 
is that his works emanate specificity as a result of these highly specified choices.  
My gravitation toward transitive painting was natural, if coincidental; 
Thompson’s work exemplifies the strangeness produced by isolated, encoded forms. His 
approach combines highly specified forms that read as specific, but do not speak of the 
specificity of any present or knowable thing9. My investigation of this work came from 
an interest in artists like Thompson, Wade Guyton, and Kelley Walker, all of whose work 
I understood as composed of intelligent, specified forms, the content of which was 
ultimately unclear to me. I have produced works that I would not call instances of 
transitive painting in the specific way that Joselit frames Thompson’s work, but which 
intentionally riff on the works of some of the previously mentioned artists in hopes of 
garnering a sense of how their works arrive at their cryptic outcomes (figures 3 and 4).  
Despite all this, I am suspicious of transitive painting as represented by 
Thompson’s work: providing a reason for every decision, no matter how encoded it may 
be, seems like the product of art school criticism. According to this logic, a definitive 
statement about the origin of a form releases the artist from responsibility for the form, 
without further questioning why one would define each of one’s choices, or evaluating 
the nature of those choices. For this reason, the systems around which works like 
Familiar Pool (Plaisir) operate are not explicitly revealed, either in the work or in 
                                                
9 Joselit concisely defines the nature of transitive painting via Thompson’s work: “they are information 
portals as opposed to information receptacles” (David Joselit, “Blanks and Noise: On Cheyney 
Thompson,” p.132.) 
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supplemental elements; the work consequently does not yield to Kippenburger’s 























figure 11: constellation of works from the Narcissus series, 2009 
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